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Indirect Rule in Armed Conflict: Theoretical Insights from Eastern DRC  
Gauthier Marchais and Raul Sanchez de la Sierra 
 
Summary 
Recent literature has shown that the study of armed conflict can be highly informative to 
understand processes of state-building. One of the fundamental choices that states or other 
military actors face when occupying new territories and populations is whether to administer 
them by developing novel administrations (direct rule), or by devolving rule to pre-existing 
local authorities (indirect rule). The literature on the political and economic legacies of 
colonial rule has shown that this choice can have far-reaching consequences in terms of 
state capacity and legitimacy, affecting long-term development trajectories. Yet the 
conditions under which indirect rule emerged in the colonial period are very difficult to 
observe and analyse. Building on the analogy between armed factions in contemporary 
conflict settings and states in the making, this paper explores the conditions under which 
indirect rule emerges in contexts of armed conflict, and the consequences that this 
governance arrangement has on local governance institutions and legitimacy.  
 
The paper adopts a historical and qualitative perspective, building on fieldwork and 
interviews carried out in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). It provides a 
theoretical discussion of the strengths and limitations of the comparison between armed 
factions and proto-states, and develops novel analytical tools to understand ‘indirect rule’ 
governance arrangements by armed factions. The paper is a theoretical and qualitative 
companion to a separate paper based on a quantitative analysis of indirect rule (Sanchez de 
la Sierra, Henn and Marchais 2017). Importantly, this is an early draft of this paper, as its 
empirical section will be completed with additional qualitative fieldwork to be carried out in 
2018, and the paper adjusted following the results of the quantitative study.  
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Practice summary 
Recent literature has shown that the study of armed conflict can be highly informative to 
understand processes of state-building. One of the fundamental choices that states or other 
military actors face when occupying new territories and populations is whether to administer 
them by developing novel administrations (direct rule), or by devolving rule to pre-existing 
local authorities (indirect rule). The literature on the political and economic legacies of 
colonial rule has shown that this choice can have far-reaching consequences in terms of 
state capacity and legitimacy, affecting long-term development trajectories. Yet the 
conditions under which indirect rule emerged in the colonial period are very difficult to 
observe and analyse. Building on the analogy between armed factions in contemporary 
conflict settings and states in the making, this paper explores the conditions under which 
indirect rule emerges in contexts of armed conflict, and the consequences that this 
governance arrangement has on local governance institutions and legitimacy.  
 
The paper adopts a historical and qualitative perspective, building on fieldwork and 
interviews carried out in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). It provides a 
theoretical discussion of the strengths and limitations of the comparison between armed 
factions and proto-states, and develops analytical tools to understand ‘indirect rule’ 
governance arrangements by armed factions. The paper is a theoretical and qualitative 
companion to a separate paper based on a quantitative analysis of indirect rule (Sanchez de 
la Sierra, Henn and Marchais forthcoming). The paper has several implications with regards 
to working in zones that are, or have been, under the control of non-state armed groups.  
 
First, governance configurations in zones of armed conflict vary significantly, which 
calls for a careful analysis of their characteristics before designing any project in such areas. 
Several factors need to be taken into account in such an analysis: the revenue streams of 
the armed groups, and their taxation practices; the social basis of the armed groups in the 
areas of control (which can vary from village to village); the level of devolvement of 
administration of the group’s rule to local authorities, and the level of centralisation; and how 
local authorities are perceived by local populations.  
 
The legitimacy of local authorities varies significantly. SDC has a policy of working with 
local authorities, in particular decentralised state entities. In conflict or post-conflict zones, 
‘indirect rule’ by armed groups considered to be illegitimate can significantly reduce the 
legitimacy of local authorities. Working with them can therefore undermine the perceived 
legitimacy and role of SDC and its partners.  
 
The capacity of local authorities to organise collective action varies significantly. 
Projects and interventions in conflict-affected areas often rely on local authorities to organise 
collective action – whether to execute a project, raise awareness around it, or mobilise the 
population to participate. Yet, in many cases, local authorities may have lost the capacity to 
organise collective action as a result of their implication in the armed conflict – such as when 
local authorities are perceived as having collaborated with illegitimate armed actors, or have 
been tied in to ‘indirect rule’ types of governance arrangements. In such cases, lack of 
capacity of local authorities is not due to lack of technical or financial capacity but instead to 
a lack of popular legitimacy. Such situations need to be better incorporated into the design of 
projects. 
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1 Introduction 
In recent years, scholarship on armed conflict and civil wars has paid substantial attention to 
the governance arrangements, political and social orders, and forms of authority that emerge 
during armed conflict (Arjona 2016; Arjona, Kasfir and Mampilly 2015; Hoffmann, 
Vlassenroot and Marchais 2016; Kalyvas 2006). Such attention has allowed scholars to 
challenge longstanding and deeply ingrained tropes about the chaotic nature of political 
order during armed conflict (often imbued with essentialist or racist undertones) and instead 
focus on the ‘open moment’ of political and social transformation which armed conflicts often 
represent (Lund 2016).  
 
One of the key questions guiding this literature concerns the causes and effects of the 
governance arrangements that are struck between armed actors and local civilian 
populations during armed conflicts. Such arrangements have been shown to have wide-
ranging consequences, explaining the variations in patterns of violence against civilians 
during armed conflict (Arjona 2016; Arjona et al. 2015; Hagmann and Peclard 2010; Kalyvas 
2006; Mampilly 2011). They have also been shown to have profound effects on the social 
and institutional organisation of societies subjected to armed group rule, which carry on well 
beyond the formal end of armed conflict (Gáfaro, Ibáñez and Justino 2014; Arjona 2016), as 
well as the nature and character of post-conflict political regimes (Huang 2016). Yet the 
causes of the emergence of certain types of governance arrangements are not well 
understood. In particular, understanding of why armed factions decide, in certain cases, to 
devolve and delegate power and administration to pre-existing political entities (which we will 
refer to as ‘indirect rule’) or, in other cases, develop their own integrated administrations to 
supplant existing governance structures (direct rule), is still in its early phases. The dense 
and rich literature on colonial indirect rule has shown that this particular mode of governance 
has had profound consequences on African states, affecting their post-colonial political and 
economic trajectories (Acemoglu et al. 2014; Mamdani 1996; Young 1994; Mamdani 2011). 
Wartime institutional configurations are therefore likely to have similar long-lasting effects in 
zones of protracted armed conflict, as well as in post-conflict settings, affecting state 
legitimacy, the nature and quality of collective action, and the capacity to effectively organise 
and deliver services.  
 
The study of this institutional configuration can also provide valuable insights into state-
building processes. In contemporary armed conflicts,1 some of the core processes of state-
making can be observed, albeit often in embryonic and short-lived forms. Warring factions 
that establish military control over territories and populations often develop the rudimentary 
features and functions of states, including resource mobilisation capacities, the provision of 
collective/public goods, and numerous forms of regulation of economic, social and political 
life. Since Charles Tilly’s seminal work on the coercive origins of the state (Tilly 1990), and 
Mancur Olson’s ‘stationary bandit’ hypothesis of state formation (Olson 1993), a growing 
literature has sought to analyse warring factions, criminal organisations and other 
organisations specialised in coercion, to identify the early stages of state formation 
processes, which are often difficult to observe in the context of advanced modern states 
(Sanchez de la Sierra, forthcoming). Albeit often in much less sophisticated and durable 
forms than long episodes of rule such as colonial rule, armed factions nevertheless face the 
fundamental dilemma of whether to develop their own institutions to administer territory and 
                                               
1  The Uppsala Conflict Data Program defines conflict as ‘a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or 
territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in 
at least 25 battle-related deaths’ (Gleditsch et al. 2002). 
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populations, or whether to enrol pre-existing authorities and political structures. The 
burgeoning academic literature on governance by military actors in conflict-affected areas 
provides ample evidence that this dilemma is at the heart of most governance endeavours 
by armed factions in contemporary conflicts (Arjona 2016; Arjona et al. 2015; Mampilly 2011; 
Sanchez de la Sierra, forthcoming; Gáfaro et al. 2014). Hechter and Kabiri (2004) have 
shown that the United States faced the same constraints as colonial states during its 
invasion and military occupation of Iraq, and developed ‘indirect rule’ systems of governance 
that resembled those imposed by colonial Britain (Hechter and Kabiri 2004: 3). Similarly, Veit 
(2010) has shown that the United Nations peacekeeping operation in eastern DRC – another 
type of military actor that engages in various forms of governance – followed similar patterns 
of rule through intermediaries that reproduced longstanding colonial practices of indirect rule.  
 
In this paper, we seek to identify the conditions under which indirect rule emerges in the 
context of contemporary armed conflicts and the mechanisms that underpin this particular 
mode of rule, by analysing the institutional arrangements established by armed factions to 
rule over territories and populations in contemporary eastern DRC. Furthermore, we identify 
some of the consequences of indirect rule for the legitimacy of local institutional and 
authority structures. 
 
We argue that the conditions under which indirect rule emerges in times of war are similar to 
those identified by Boone (2003) as determining the emergence of indirect rule in the 
colonial era. The first of these is the nature of the tax and resource base, which determines 
the types of strategies that armed groups establish to extract revenue, and whether or not 
they can rely on local authorities to extract these revenues. These vary substantially 
according to whether or not a given area contains high-value natural or agricultural 
resources (such as minerals or cash crops) or whether the main source of revenue for the 
armed factions is the civilian population’s regular economic activity. The second condition is 
the level of centralisation and relative power of pre-existing political authorities over a given 
area. This variable has multiple effects on an armed group’s decision to enrol pre-existing 
authorities. On one hand, armed groups that are considered to have no legitimacy to rule 
(i.e. whose presence and actions are not endorsed by local authorities and populations) 
often attempt to neutralise or dismantle the power of pre-existing authorities, which can 
represent significant challenges to their rule and can lead to organised resistance. This, 
however, is often a last resort solution, as armed factions first attempt to co-opt such leaders 
and take hold over their mobilisation capacity, which represents a particular ‘technological’ 
advantage for groups seeking to maximise the mobilisation of taxes and labour. The third 
and final condition is the nature of the armed group’s social basis. When armed groups are 
backed by a significant class of people who stand to benefit from their rule, armed groups 
tend to follow pressures for these groups to modify property rights in the favour of this ruling 
class, and then enforce these novel property rights through their coercive apparatus, and the 
development of a novel administrative apparatus – direct rule.  
 
We then show that the effects of indirect rule in wartime governance are similar to those 
identified by Mamdani in his seminal study of colonial indirect rule – in particular, that it 
distorts local governance by thwarting the direction of accountability of local authorities, who 
are forced – or sometimes strategically or opportunistically inclined – to be accountable to 
their ruler rather than their populations (Mamdani 1996). As a result, local authorities see 
their authority and legitimacy erode, although this is neither a linear nor uniform effect (nor 
one that happens only in situations of armed conflict). Such effects, however, depend closely 
on the relation between the armed factions and local populations – in particular, the 
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perception of the armed group’s legitimacy, which depends on their social and ethnic 
constitution, and the perceived legitimacy of their claims to rule.  
 
Furthermore, we show that violent conflict imprints specific characteristics to the ‘indirect 
rule’ type of governance arrangements that emerge. In particular, the establishment of direct 
or indirect forms of rule is dictated as much by military objectives as economic ones and, 
more specifically, counter-insurgency measures designed to exert close control over civilian 
populations. These constitute one of the central differences between wartime governance 
arrangements and the institutional arrangements that emerge in relatively stable political 
contexts over long periods of time. Such differences also affect, and are visible in, the effects 
of wartime indirect rule. The acute social polarisation caused by the violence – a distinctive 
feature that can be found across civil wars (Wood 2008) – tends to enhance and accelerate 
the erosion of local legitimacy caused by indirect rule.  
 
The paper begins by discussing the theoretical strengths and limitations of the comparison 
between indirect rule as a practice of government and the types of institutional arrangements 
that emerge between armed factions and local socio-political entities. Bearing in mind that 
governance during war does not emerge from a historical vacuum, and following recent 
contentions that more attention should be paid to the continuities between peacetime and 
wartime processes (Richards 2005; Munive 2011; Hoffmann, Marchais and Vlassenroot 
2016), the next section looks at the historical origins of indirect rule in eastern DRC, during 
the colonial era, and the changes brought to this form of rule by the post-colonial states. The 
third section focuses on the governance arrangements that have emerged in the eastern 
provinces of the DRC during the 20-year armed conflict of the late twentieth and early 
twenty-first century, focusing on the determinants of the emergence of ‘indirect rule’ types of 
arrangements between armed factions and local authorities and institutions, as well as on 
their effects on local governance structures.  
 
2  Theoretical considerations: the causes and 
consequences of indirect rule 
Indirect rule as a practice of government is as old as empires, and has been described in the 
writings of Thucydides and Aristotle. Machiavelli identifies the dilemma of direct vs indirect 
rule as one of the most crucial ones faced by rulers conquering territory and populations, 
and opens The Prince by discussing it. During the European colonisation of Asia and Africa, 
indirect rule became a cornerstone of the doctrine of government over conquered territories 
and populations, and was extensively theorised and formalised. Long considered to be a 
superior form of rule, it supposedly minimised the costs of colonial government while 
preserving indigenous political and social structures.  
 
In this section, we briefly highlight the factors that have been advanced in the literature to 
explain both the emergence of indirect rule and its consequences. We focus mostly on 
colonial indirect rule, as this constitutes one of the most extensive and recent occurrences of 
this practice of government, and one that bears particular relevance to our case study, as 
the Congolese state was structured by colonial indirect rule. However, we also seek to bring 
in other examples and other literature to bear on the analysis, as there have been numerous 
manifestations of indirect rule configurations of government. The degree to which highly 
heterogeneous forms of rule and power-sharing agreements can be subsumed under the 
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binary categories of direct vs indirect rule is, of course, debatable, yet, as Gerring et al. 
argue, it serves as a useful heuristic device to categorise forms of power, and should be 
conceived as a continuum, from full direct rule to full indirect rule (Gerring et al. 2011: 378).  
 
2.1 The determinants of colonial and other forms of indirect rule 
Studies of colonial indirect rule have traditionally explained its emergence as resulting from 
the political cultures and preferences of the metropoles, identifying it as a distinctively British 
mode of imperial rule (Crowder 1964). The term was coined by Lord Lugard, a British 
colonial administrator who developed and theorised this particular mode of rule, which was 
then adopted throughout the British Empire from the mid-1920s (Lugard 1965). Recent 
studies, however, have shown that similar forms of rule through ‘native’ authorities were also 
practised in the French, Belgian and Portuguese colonial empires, and that there existed 
significant ‘internal’ variation as to the degree of direct vs indirect rule implemented in these 
empires (Boone 2003; Hoffmann 2014). Looking at variations in the ‘political topography’ of 
African states in West Africa, Boone (2003) showed that it was the interplay of several 
factors that explained whether the colonial authorities chose to establish more direct/indirect 
modes of administration of different areas. Here, we review the different factors that have 
been identified in several contexts as playing a role in the establishment of this particular 
type of rule. 
 
2.1.1 Revenue and resources 
This hypothesis posits that the governance arrangements imposed by the ruling actor will 
depend on the types of revenue generation activities it can establish in the ruled territories 
(Gerring et al. 2011: 378). This relates to a range of potential revenue streams, such as the 
capacity to control the extraction of natural resources, the capacity to tax different forms of 
economic activity or to tax the population, as well as the capacity to directly control markets 
or appropriate economic assets. The literature on colonial rule has thoroughly documented 
how the nature of the extractive economies established in the colonies has shaped 
governance arrangements. Boone (2003) showed that colonial states were more likely to 
invest in the development of a ‘direct’ administration in areas with high-value extractable 
resource, such as mineral deposits or cash crops. In such areas, the development of state 
administrations served the purpose of ensuring enhanced control over these resources, but 
also of enabling and enforcing the transfer of property (and particularly land) rights to the 
European colonial class, through the establishment of ‘statist’ land tenure regimes (Boone 
2014).  
 
2.1.2 Centralisation of pre-existing political entities 
Second, the level of political centralisation of the pre-existing polities is another significant 
factor in explaining the emergence of direct or indirect rule, albeit one whose effect is neither 
linear nor uniform (Boone 2003). Gerring et al. also argue that this is the central factor which, 
ceterus paribus, explains the adoption of indirect rule as a strategy of government (Gerring 
et al. 2011: 378). On one hand, the larger and more centralised the pre-existing political 
entity, the more indirect rule constitutes an appealing strategy for external rulers as the 
enhanced mobilisation capacity and legitimacy of such entities can be co-opted, at least in 
the short term. Such entities, however, can also constitute serious obstacles for rule, as they 
have higher capacity for contentious and insurgent collective action. The larger and more 
centralised kingdoms and empires on the African continent often deployed the fiercest 
resistance during the colonial conquest and early colonial era, which in many cases led to 
the assassination, imprisonment or deportation of the rulers of these entities and the 
dismantlement of their governance institutions. Similarly, in their attempts to build the post-
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independence African states, the leaders of African independence movements often 
attempted to supress or reduce the power of customary chiefs, as these could represent a 
significant impediment to their power and state-building projects.2  
 
These studies provide strong insights into the factors that influence these governance 
arrangements, but the study of the emergence of indirect rule arrangements in the colonial 
setting remains limited by methodological constraints and the scarcity of sources. Indeed, 
while they often provide detailed accounts of the choices faced and made by colonial 
administrators, colonial archives tend to leave out the point of view of those subjected to 
colonial rule (Mitchell 2002). The understanding of the role of the characteristics of 
‘indigenous’ societies in the emergence of indirect rule arrangements therefore remains 
limited by the scarcity of empirical evidence beyond the (limited) colonial archives and oral 
history sources.  
 
2.1.3 The consequences of indirect rule 
The effects of colonial indirect rule were progressively uncovered in post-colonial writings on 
political development on the continent. In his seminal book on the legacies of colonial rule, 
Mamdani (1996) has shown that one of the most perverse effects of indirect rule was to 
thwart basic mechanisms of political accountability, making local chiefs enrolled by the 
colonial state accountable to the colonial officials rather than to their constituencies, for 
whom they became ‘decentralised despots’ (ibid.). This caused a progressive erosion of the 
legitimacy of both local chiefs and the colonial state, which in turn affected the legitimacy of 
post-colonial states on the continent which, in many cases, reproduced and extended 
colonial practices of government. Similarly, Young (1994) argued that colonial practices of 
rule and governance were re-appropriated and re-produced by post-colonial leaders. Yet the 
experience of indirect rule during the colonial era does not in itself guarantee that the post-
colonial states will remained locked in its structural legacy, as this depends on the political 
choices of the independence and post-independence leaders. The weakening legacy of 
colonial indirect rule on post-colonial states is particularly strong in countries where the post-
colonial leaders preserved or reinforced it as a mode of governance, such as in Sierra 
Leone, where leaders were highly involved in the building of the post-colonial state, and 
further institutionalised the indirect rule configuration of governance – albeit with strong 
regional variations (Acemoglu et al. 2014). 
 
3  Identifying wartime indirect rule: 
definitions and mechanisms 
3.1 Indirect rule and exogeneity  
While comparing the modes of governance of armed factions with those of fully fledged 
states (and, in particular, the colonial state) is a useful heuristic device to highlight core 
governance mechanisms and choices, the comparison also has several limitations, which 
are important to identify up front.  
 
First, it is necessary to clarify the definition of indirect rule and the defining features of that 
particular institutional configuration, and its applicability to contexts of war. What 
                                               
2  This was the case, for example, in Uganda where Milton Obote drove the King of Buganda (the Kabaka) out of power in 
1966 and attempted to break the institutional basis of his power (Reid 2002). 
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differentiates indirect rule from devolved or decentralised governance? Rather than a clearly 
identifiable institutional configuration of government, indirect rule was a doctrine of rule 
developed and theorised by colonial administrators – an ideological framework to guide 
interactions and rule over ‘indigenous’ populations. Erecting this historically situated doctrine 
of government into an analytical category to be used to describe particular institutional 
configurations thus requires deciding on its distinctive features. Indirect rule, as has been 
analysed in the colonial context, occurs when a state that conquers territory relies on the 
pre-existing structures of authority and political organisation of that territory in order to rule. It 
is therefore a form of devolved or decentralised government, with the distinctive 
characteristic that the conquering actor bears a form of ‘exogeneity’ to polities and societies 
that are subjected to its rule. Before the conquest and immediately after, the coercive 
apparatus of the conquering actor, as well as its administration and institutions, are not tied 
to the political and social organisation of the conquered territory (i.e. not endogenous). The 
conquered populations are thus part of political and social systems that are separate from 
those of the conquering entity.  
 
This was mostly the case during the initial periods of colonial rule on the African continent: 
The political organisation and characteristics of the European states were fairly distinct from 
the local ‘indigenous’ political systems (although their economies had become 
interdependent as a result of the slave trade, among other factors). This separation and 
distinction between two separate social, political and cultural spheres became the 
cornerstone of the indirect rule doctrine and ideology, which the colonial state sought to 
enforce throughout the colonial era (Mamdani 1996). In practice, this separation was much 
less clear-cut, as the institutions of colonial rule became tied to local political structures, and 
the conquered populations became subjected to the colonial system. As Mamdani (1996) 
and Boone (2014) have shown, the idea that indirect rule somehow ‘preserved’ native 
institutions and cultures by keeping them separate was an illusion entertained by colonial 
administrators and academics who had provided the intellectual justification for indirect rule. 
Rather than being a continuation of pre-colonial systems, the institutions that emerged to 
rule over the native populations were integral parts of the colonial system itself. Yet this idea 
of initial ‘exogeneity’, and of separation between political systems, remains an important 
theoretical and analytical feature of indirect rule. 
 
Conceptualising the indirect rule institutional arrangements that emerge between armed 
actors and local authorities in contexts of warfare therefore relies on this assumption of 
‘exogeneity’. Yet, as we will show, knowledge of the institutional origins of armed factions in 
conflict zones such as eastern DRC does not usually allow this assumption to be made. In 
cases where the conquering military actor is a full-fledged state with a political and 
administrative capacity that is independent (at least at the onset) from the conquered 
entities, the comparison bears immediate relevance. This is the case, for example, with the 
United States (US) and coalition military occupations of Iraq, as the US military and 
administrative capacity bore a strong level of ‘exogeneity’ to the institutions of the occupied 
countries, generating a situation very similar to the early phases of colonial military 
occupation (Hechter and Kabiri 2004). This argument has also been made in the case of 
international military intervention in eastern DRC, in particular with regard to the United 
Nations peacekeeping operation (Veit 2010).3 The prerequisite for characterising such a 
configuration as indirect rule, however, is the international intervention’s ‘detachment’ – i.e. 
                                               
3  Veit argues that the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the DR Congo (MONUSCO), a large-scale 
military operation, ended up having to resort to intermediaries to achieve its objectives because of the legacy of colonial 
indirect rule in the region, thus reinstating similar – but of course, not equal – types of governance arrangements (Veit 
2010).  
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the fact that it drew its resources and legitimacy from outside, thus supposing a form of 
‘exogeneity’ (ibid.: 17). Such configurations, however, are quite exceptional. In most 
contemporary conflicts, it is difficult to consider the conquering and ruling entity as 
exogenous to conquered entities. Even in the case of international military interventions and 
occupations, such as French military interventions on the African continent, a closer look at 
the institutional, military and administrative history shows that the assumption of exogeneity 
does not hold. In configurations that have been characterised as ‘neocolonial’, epitomised by 
France’s relation with its former colonies, the interdependence of the former metropoles’ 
economic and social structures with those of its former colonies makes the assumption of 
‘exogeneity’ difficult to sustain. The institutional architecture of the French government and 
administration, but also the military and administrative capacity of the former French 
colonies, are intimately imbricated and co-dependent. France’s capacity for military 
intervention, for example, is institutionally and culturally embedded in several West African 
national military administrations (Luckham 1982). 
 
The case is even less clear in contemporary civil wars, where occupying and ruling entities 
are often historically part of the same polities, countries and societies as occupied and ruled 
entities. Indeed, in many cases, armed groups emerge as social or political movements that 
eventually adopt violent tactics and develop armed branches. Many of these armed groups 
have deep social and institutional bases in the societies in which they emerged and evolve, 
and are part of larger power networks that span political, economic and military spheres. 
Thus, the assumption of exogeneity does not necessarily hold, as the pre-existing political 
institutions which can be subjected to armed group rule do not necessarily pre-date the 
armed groups, and both can be part of larger forms of rule and political control. Thus, 
conceptualising armed groups as unitary military actors, akin to states, which decide on 
whether or not to enrol local authorities to maximise revenue extraction, while perhaps useful 
to single out the choices made by armed actors, does not fully account for the fact that the 
armed groups can themselves be dependent on these local authorities, or be part of larger 
networks or institutional configurations of power. This constitutes an important caveat to the 
analysis of indirect rule in wartime configurations.  
 
3.2 The old order or the new? The constitution of political and social order in war 
Recent academic literature on armed conflict and civil wars has revealed a particular tension 
in how the social and political ‘orders’ that emerge in contexts of armed conflict are 
conceptualised. On one side, recent scholarship has strongly emphasised the novelty of the 
political and social orders that emerged in times of war, conceived as deep ruptures and 
reconstitutions of such orders (Arjona 2016; Vlassenroot and Raeymaekers 2004; Arjona et 
al. 2015; Gáfaro et al. 2014; Kalyvas 2006; Mampilly 2011). While recognising the contested, 
incomplete and often temporary nature of the political and social orders that emerge in civil 
wars, their novelty has generally been attributed to two particular factors. First, the radical or 
revolutionary character of the projects envisioned and enacted by certain armed groups such 
as the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) or the Islamic State, who establish 
radical reform of property rights, judicial and legal systems, ideologies and social norms, etc. 
Second, the more gradual transformation induced by the presence and centrality of military 
actors – a process known as militarisation – that affects all aspects of economic, social and 
political life in conflict-affected areas, and forms the basis of the emergence of new political 
and social orders (Wood 2008; Verweijen 2013; Bernazolli and Flint 2009). On the other 
hand, such a focus on the rupture and novelty of the political orders that emerge in zones of 
protracted conflict has tended to overlook the continuities between such orders and pre-war 
legacies (Lund 2016).  
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Arguing against the strict separation between wartime and peacetime orders, recent authors 
have sought to show the continuities between the two (Richards 2005), and how long-term 
structural features of political organisation shape the characteristics of warfare, such as the 
mobilisation of combatants by armed factions (Munive 2011). Recent studies have shown 
that, despite being predominantly characterised as a weak or failed state, the Congolese 
state remains the central regulating actor and template for political organisation in the 
country (Englebert and Tull 2013). This is even the case in the conflict-affected eastern 
provinces, where several of the rebel factions use the Congolese state as their central 
ideological and organisational template (Hoffmann and Vlassenroot 2014). This tension 
between the generation of novel political and social configurations, and the structuring 
legacy of longstanding forms of rule, is therefore one of the defining characteristics of the 
current situation in eastern DRC. It surfaces, for example, in the patterns of taxation that 
emerge in contemporary eastern DRC: while in the context of warfare and contested 
authority a large range of actors seek to impose taxes and make claims to legitimate political 
authority, the ways in which they do so display strong similarities and continuities with 
longstanding modes of taxation and rule (Hoffmann et al. 2016). ‘Indirect rule’, and what 
Hoffmann (2014) calls ‘ethnogovernmentality’, therefore remain among the most enduring 
and structuring templates of political organisation and rule in the region, which continue to 
prevail despite numerous attempts to suppress or alter them (Hoffmann 2014; Mamdani 
2011). 
 
4  Indirect rule in eastern Congo 
4.1 A brief history of indirect rule in eastern Congo 
Before examining the governance arrangements established by armed groups in the 
contemporary context of protracted conflict in eastern DRC, we start with an overview of the 
history of eastern Congo’s ‘political topography’, to trace in particular the genealogy of 
indirect rule in the region. We will show that, while the region was marked until the mid-
nineteenth century by decentralised lineage-based forms of rule, external powers started 
establishing military and political control over the region in the nineteenth century, using local 
chiefs and leaders as intermediaries – setting the first precedent for indirect rule in the 
region’s recent history. The colonial state significantly extended such practices, making 
indirect rule an official doctrine, and enshrining local chiefs as key intermediaries of the 
state. These events presented deep and durable historical templates of rule in the region, 
and were largely continued and reinforced in the post-colonial era.  
 
Up until the mid-nineteenth century, at the moment of the arrival of the first exploratory 
European expeditions that would pave the road to colonial expansion, the region that now 
constitutes the provinces of North and South Kivu was marked by political fluidity, dominated 
by lineage-based systems, and connected through the inter-lacustrine trade networks, which 
aggregated into several chiefdoms such as Bushi, Buhavu, Butembo or Buhunde, and, 
further to the east, the great ‘Rega cluster’ formed of a constellation of smaller and semi-
autonomous ‘forest societies’ (Biebuyck 1973; Newbury 1992). While some of the chiefdoms 
displayed signs of political centralisation and social stratification, in particular Bushi, they 
were incomparable to the much more structured, centralised and socially stratified ‘states’ 
that were consolidating on the eastern shores of the Great Lakes, in particular the Kingdom 
of Rwanda (Newbury 2009: 69). This, however, did not mean that notions of territorialised 
authority and political competences were absent in eastern Congo (Chretien 2000: 149). 
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While political authority was centred on the figure of the chief, it was elaborately balanced 
along lineage groups, and political competition concentrated on succession to the thrones of 
these entities (Newbury 1992). These polities displayed little signs of large-scale resource 
mobilisation and accumulation.  
 
From the mid-nineteenth century, the relative isolation of the region and its political 
equilibriums were deeply shattered by several converging forces. The belligerent 
expansionism of the Rwandan Kingdom under Rwabugiri was projected unto the region as it 
carried out repeated military expeditions to expand its territory and force neighbouring 
kingdoms into vassalage. Superimposed on these military incursions was the expansion of 
ivory and slave trade networks into the region, which introduced large-scale accumulative 
modes of resource mobilisation and labour conscription, and the rudiments of ‘indirect rule’ 
types of governance arrangements. Indeed, the East African slave trade, dominated by the 
sultanate of Zanzibar and the ‘Turks’ of Khartoum, had been expanding throughout the Great 
Lakes along with ivory and other trades, targeting the weaker and more politically 
fragmented areas, including the Western Shores of Lake Kivu where slave-raiding 
expeditions intensified from the mid-nineteenth century. These expeditions relied on 
elaborate networks of intermediaries and columns of ‘African’ mercenaries recruited 
throughout the region, known as the arabises. Tippu Tip, representative of the sultanate of 
Zanzibar, established himself in Kasongo in eastern Congo, and progressively became the 
most powerful trader in the region, commanding large military expeditions and setting up the 
foundations of a regional empire. Under Tippu Tip’s rule, local chiefs were enlisted as 
intermediaries and charged with mobilising resources, in particular taxes and labour to serve 
as soldiers or porters with the missionary army.  
 
As in much of the African continent, the colonial conquest – and colonial rule – brought 
significant and durable changes to the political landscape of eastern Congo. The absorption 
of the region into the Congo Free State was a violent and gradual process. Tippu Tip’s 
control over the eastern parts at the onset of the colonial conquest made him an 
advantageous interlocutor for the Belgians, and he was appointed as the governor of the 
eastern part of the Free State. This was the first manifestation of a practice that would 
become a hallmark of Belgian rule over the Congo, and of central African colonies more 
generally – the sub-contracting of rule over entire parts of the colonies to powerful 
intermediaries, from local power brokers in the early stages of colonial rule, to concessionary 
companies later on (Amin 1972; Mkandawire 2010).  
 
After conquering the eastern regions and removing Tippu Tip from power, the colonial state 
soon developed institutional means to mobilise ‘internal’ resources and labour from its 
territory, which formed the first steps towards the institutionalisation of indirect rule. 
Legislation and decrees were passed as early as 1891–92 requiring African chiefs to provide 
prestations in food and corvees (compulsory unpaid work) to colonial agents, as well as 
soldiers to staff the colonial army, the Force Publique (Northrup 1988: 41). From the 1920s, 
a significant rise in private investments in eastern Congo changed the configuration of 
economic activity and the role of the state in ensuring that sufficient resources and labour 
were mobilised to ensure significant investments were made. The development of export 
agriculture, mining and trade, and the resulting increase in infrastructure investments, led to 
a sharp rise in the demand for labour. The role of the colonial state shifted from being the 
primary employer of labour to the primary provider of labour to the colonial private sector, as 
well as being responsible for modifying the legal and regulatory environment in order to 
favour the establishment of colonial capitalists. The state continued to oversee labour 
recruitment throughout eastern Congo, institutionalising it through legislation, and 
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establishing quotas to ensure a steady supply of labour. Although efforts were made to 
reduce the tax and conscription burden on local populations, the system remained highly 
coercive, with quotas of taxes and labourers being imposed on village chiefs, and several 
instances of revolts occurring as a result.  
 
Colonial rule in eastern Congo was carried out through what Hoffmann (2014) calls 
‘ethnogovernmentality’ – the organisation of mediated state power through the constitution of 
ethno-territories, which corresponded more or less to the pre-existing socio-political entities 
(Hoffmann 2014: 116). In eastern Congo, the creation of the native homelands and the 
imposition of what is known as indirect rule was a messy and violent process, giving rise to 
multiple resistance movements, but also setting the scene for internal infightings between 
different ethno-territorial groups. The institution of the chief was central in the colonial state’s 
apparatus of resource mobilisation. As previously mentioned, chiefs had already been 
playing the role of mediators in the mobilisation of resources under Zanzibari rule, relied 
upon to conscribe slave soldiers and mobilise various forms of material contributions 
(Northrup 1988: 45). The colonial state extended, systematised and institutionalised the role 
of the chief, backed by a discursive justification inspired in part by the nascent discipline of 
anthropology, as well as pseudo-scientific justifications of indirect rule that accompanied the 
colonial project (Hoffmann 2014). In 1891, the institution of the chiefdom was recognised by 
royal decree, enshrining native chiefs into the colonial state (Hoffmann 2014: 121). The land 
over which indigenous chiefs ruled was given a separate legal status as terres indigenes 
(native land).4 A series of decrees and laws, in particular the law of 2 May 1910, further 
delineated the role of the chief, defining his power over territory and people.  
 
The creation of the native authorities – which included an administrative ‘gridding’ of rural 
areas with the establishment of chiefs and sub-chiefs,5 as well as mapping efforts and 
population censuses carried out in the early twentieth century – served two main functions. 
On one hand, the native authorities ensured control over rural populations at a low cost. On 
the other, they served to mobilise taxes and labour destined to a range of activities, from 
public works for the colonial state (in particular porterage) to the various industries, to the 
staffing of the forces publiques, the colonial army. This put the chiefs in a difficult position, as 
they often tried to protect their subjects from the demanding quotas of the state, but 
nevertheless had to comply or face being deposed, imprisoned or even assassinated.  
 
Of all the Belgian Congo, the populations of eastern Congo opposed one of the fiercest 
resistances to the colonial occupation. Resistance in the region started early on, as a 
continuation of the resistance against the Rwandan invaders and the slave raids by the 
Zanzibari and arabises. The ‘pacification’ of the southern areas of Kivu (that correspond to 
the current province of South Kivu) required significant military efforts, in particular in the 
bellicose kingdoms of Bushi and the chiefdoms of Kabare and Ngweshe, which opposed 
severe resistance to colonial rule and the taxes imposed by the colonial state up to the onset 
of the first world war. The colonial authorities in Costermansville (the former name of 
Bukavu) used both military force and political manoeuvring to quell the violent resistance, 
and progressively impose the colonial order. Brutal retaliations were organised against 
rebellious chiefs, rebellious chiefdoms were broken apart and incorporated into different 
administrative entities, and cooperative chiefs were given ascendance over rebellious ones 
in the crafting of the colonial native authorities (Hoffmann 2014: 155). In many cases, this 
accentuated pre-existing rivalries between chiefs and often led to violence, with ‘rebel’ chiefs 
                                               
4  Native lands were governed under customary right, following the 3 June 1906 and 31 May 1934 decrees (Mpoyi 2013). 
5  Sub-Chiefdoms were instituted by the law of 2 May 1910.  
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sending punitive expeditions to collaborating villages, and the colonial state in turn 
organising violent punitive expeditions in areas under the rule of rebel chiefs. Resistance 
took multiple forms, from overt resistance by hosting armed factions, to more passive forms 
of resistance against the colonially imposed taxes and forced works.  
 
Thus, during the second half of the nineteenth century and the early colonial period, two 
logics of political organisation emerged in the region that would prove highly resilient 
throughout the twentieth century and in the wars of the 1990s, providing the core 
governance templates that can still be observed to this day. An accumulative or extractive 
logic of governance and resources extraction was instilled by the Zanzibari rulers, and then 
significantly expanded by the colonial state. Through a violent and conflictual process, local 
chiefs became one of the colonial state’s most important ‘handles’ to mobilise labour on a 
large scale, and were incorporated into the very architecture of the colonial state’s system of 
indirect rule. On the other hand, the violence of the colonial penetration, the heavy taxation 
that the colonial state exerted, and the political engineering that the colonial authorities 
engaged in sparked several armed resistance movements from the polities of eastern 
Congo. In conjunction with these processes of large-scale mobilisation and resistance, 
economies of predation and protection emerged in remote areas and became closely 
imbricated with existing forms of social and political organisation, with the figure of the 
warlord emerging as a new form of authority. The nexus between established forms of 
authority, external forms of power and violent actors would remain prevalent throughout the 
twentieth century.  
 
The dramatic post-colonial history of the former Belgian Congo has had a tendency to defy 
all classifications and comparisons, breeding an entire vocabulary seeking to capture its 
convoluted trajectory. While often adding obscurity rather than dissipating it, this language 
reflects a reality of extremes in a country that has alternated between violent civil wars and 
abusive, autocratic and exploitative forms of power.  
 
The complexity of the post-colonial trajectory of the Congo is tied to several factors. First, the 
country’s vastness and extreme geological diversity have been a structural hindrance to the 
effective projection and centralisation of state power (Herbst 2000). The distant provinces of 
the east proved particularly difficult to control, militarily and administratively, as had been the 
case under colonial rule. Second, the colonial origins of the state and its political architecture 
resulted in structural imbalances that underpinned the repeated crises that the country 
underwent (Young 1994; Young and Turner 1985). In particular, the ethno-territorial basis of 
political power – a heritage of indirect rule – structurally shaped aggregate political interests 
and the lines of political competition in the post-colonial era, a feature that would take an 
abrasive turn in the wars of the 1990s.  
 
Following independence, when political power was taken by a nascent political class with 
great haste, the country fell into a deep crisis that reflected both the weakness of its political 
institutions and the numerous vested interests that underpinned political control over the 
country’s territory and resources. As Kisangani (2012) argues, the wars of secession that 
followed independence were consequences of the ‘politics of exclusion’ that have been a 
dominant feature of political competition in post-independence Congo. Exclusion at the ‘top’ 
entails exclusion of entire ethno-territorial constituencies, thus creating the impetus not only 
for excluded elites to resort to violent methods, but also the structural conditions for entire 
ethno-territorial constituencies to follow because their ‘exclusion’ is felt not only at a political 
level but also at the economic and social levels.  
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Post-independence political turmoil quickly turned into violent conflict, with the secession of the 
provinces of Katanga (1960–63) and Kasai (1960–62) and the rebellions of Kwilu (1964–65) 
and the eastern provinces (1964–66). Following his coup d’état, Mobutu was able to quell 
these rebellions and ‘restore order’ by imposing a highly coercive regime. Contrary to the 
caricatured tone of many depictions of Mobutu’s reign, he had crafted an extensive 
apparatus of power over the Congolese population – in particular through his party and his 
ruthless control over the security forces (Young and Turner 1985; Tull 2003, 2005). 
Extensive measures were taken to centralise and streamline a hierarchical state apparatus 
in order to exert full control over Congolese society. The objective, clearly stated by Mobutu, 
was direct rule – supposedly to steer the country towards progress and development, 
following the prevailing model of the developmental state.  
 
The centralisation of administrative authority, however, meant that the Mobutist state 
reinstated many of the institutions and modes of rule of the colonial era. Central to this 
administrative apparatus were the commissioners or ‘prefets’, appointed at province level, 
who had extensive power over the local administration and police and security forces 
(Callaghy 1984: 243–44; Young and Turner 1985: 226). While the objective was to ensure a 
direct, centralised and effective chain of state command, Mobutu did not trust the 
commissioners, whose regional powers could allow them to foment political contestation or 
revolt. As a result, he would systematically change them around, to stop them from building 
local power bases.  
 
Traditional authorities were not a central part the modernist, socialist and pan-Africanist 
conception of the nation which Mobutu sought to incarnate and, throughout his rule, Mobutu 
had a highly ambivalent relationship with them. His doctrine of ‘Zairianization’ was to create 
a new African man, infused with the traditional but resolutely modern, unburdened by the 
short-sightedness of provincial and ethnic identities or by the crippling legacy of the colonial 
state, both represented by the traditional authorities.  
 
More pragmatically, customary authorities, whose power had in several areas been 
extended during colonial rule, represented a direct obstacle to Mobutu’s power and his 
project of creating a centralised administrative apparatus. As a result, Mobutu sought to 
abolish customary authority and the ‘bifurcation’ at the heart of Congolese socio-political life, 
through a series of decrees from the late 1960s and early 1970s, only to face widespread 
resistance which forced him to abandon these decrees. Despite its post-racial, post-ethnic 
rhetoric focused on the unity of the nation, the Congolese state perpetuated a ‘bifurcated’ 
system of political organisation. On one side, those areas with lucrative economic resources 
were subjected to ‘direct’ forms of rule, whose objectives were to consolidate and enforce 
the property rights of either the state or its clients in these areas. On the other, less lucrative 
areas were left to various devolved forms of governance, either to representatives of the 
state or to customary authorities.  
 
4.2 Indirect rule in the Congolese wars 
The political crisis that Zaire underwent in the early 1990s and the two large-scale wars of 
1996–97 and 1998–2003 brought momentous change, with the Congolese state losing its 
(tenuous) control over the territory as armed factions seized control over large swathes of 
the country, particularly in the east. Despite the peace agreement and the official end to the 
war in 2003, the armed conflict persisted in the eastern provinces, where to this day several 
dozens of non-state armed factions operate in rural areas, regularly taking control over 
territory and populations. An important stream of recent academic literature and high-quality 
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journalism has countered the widespread idea that the east of the country was prey to 
undecipherable chaos and destruction, showing on the contrary that there existed multiple – 
if unstable – forms of social and economic order, including in those areas subject to 
repeated armed conflict. Particular attention has recently been paid to the governance 
arrangements and political settlements that have developed between armed actors and 
civilian leaders and populations in the rural areas of the east. Recent projects, in particular 
Usalama I and II,6 have highlighted the complexity of these governance arrangements, 
owing to the deep social base of the armed factions evolving in the east, and their 
multidimensional roles in contemporary economic, social and political issues.  
 
Without seeking to reduce this complexity and heterogeneity, our objective here is to focus 
on the determinants of the particular choices the groups make to either develop their own 
administration (direct rule) or enrol existing authorities to carry out their rule (indirect rule). 
As discussed in the introduction, the objective is not to equate these institutional 
configurations to those developed during the colonial era, because of the combined issues of 
exogeneity and temporality. A large number of the armed factions operating in eastern DRC 
have profound institutional and social roots, having emerged either as political projects 
formulated and supported by local or regional elite networks, or as ‘bottom-up’ social 
movements, garnering significant popular support (Stearns and Botiveau 2013; Stearns et al. 
2013; Vogel 2014). In such cases, they are an integral part of the socio-political 
environments in which they emerge and evolve, often with longstanding institutional links 
tied to the region’s history of violent governance and armed resistance, and reinforced by the 
militarisation of society, which the longstanding armed conflict has triggered.  
 
Yet the ‘political topography’ of eastern DRC, and the fragmentation and heterogeneity of the 
armed groups active there, warrants an inquiry into the determinants of the emergence of 
direct vs indirect modes of armed group rule over territory and populations. The institutional 
and political fragmentation of eastern DRC – a result of the region’s history of decentralised 
socio-political organisation, the ‘politics of exclusion’ practised during the colonial and post-
colonial eras, and the fracturing of economic and political spaces induced by the war – 
entails that the governance arrangements developed by armed groups display significant 
variation. The highly localised basis of political identities, a result of the territorialisation of 
rule and political identities (Hoffmann 2014), entails that armed factions establishing military 
control over territories and populations do not necessarily enjoy popular legitimacy and 
recognition of their right to rule (Hoffmann et al. 2016). In numerous instances, non-‘native’ 
armed groups have ruled over territories in which they were considered as illegitimate 
‘foreigners’, which increases the pertinence of the application of the conceptual framework of 
indirect rule.  
 
The constraints armed factions face in terms of logistical capacity, military technology, and 
difficulty to govern over hostile local populations means there are substantial benefits in 
seeking to delegate the collection of resources – taxes, labour and in-kind contributions – as 
well as the administration of daily affairs to local chiefs, depending on their legitimacy and 
popular support. While certain chiefs were appointed by the colonial state and lack historical 
legitimacy, and others may have seen their legitimacy reduced by their enrolment to the 
state and post-colonial state, many customary chiefs in eastern DRC continue to enjoy 
                                               
6  The Rift Valley Institute Usalama Project is a qualitative research project aimed at understanding the nature of armed 
groups in eastern DRC and the political, social and economic dynamics of the eastern Congolese armed conflict. Phase I 
(2012–13) was led by Jason Stearns, and phase II (2015–16) was led by Judith Verweijen. They constitute the most 
comprehensive qualitative study to date on armed groups in eastern DRC. For more information see: 
http://riftvalley.net/project/usalama-project.  
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substantial legitimacy. This is tied not only to the mythical and religious basis of their power, 
and the legitimacy conferred on them by widespread recognition of lineage-based modes of 
authority transmission, but also to their complex relations of interdependence with the 
constituencies they symbolically embody, particularly their status as custodians of the land 
(Chretien 2000; Biebuyck 1973; Newbury 2009). While in some cases eroding their power, 
the repeated crises the country has experienced have, in other cases, reinforced it, as they 
often came to represent the sole figures of authority in contexts of sustained crisis of 
authority and governance. Thus, as a result of their widespread legitimacy and their 
centrality in local networks of power, chiefs can command substantial resource mobilisation 
capacities. Co-opting local chiefs and establishing rudimentary forms of ‘indirect rule’ 
configurations of governance can therefore significantly increase control over a particular 
region.  
 
Yet, as mentioned in the introduction, this can come at a cost. Powerful chiefs can seek to 
undermine the power of the group, either by organising various forms of ‘passive’ resistance 
against the armed group’s resource and tax collection requirements, or by organising 
peaceful or violent resistance to the group’s presence and rule. As a result, groups might 
prefer to replace chiefs that are too powerful or insufficiently compliant to their demands, 
often resorting to violence to do so. They might also seek to develop enhanced control over 
certain sectors of economic or social activity by developing ‘direct’ forms of control over 
them, either by modifying property rights or establishing monopolies. But their capacity to do 
so hinges on their administrative and logistical capacity, and the institutional and social 
composition of the communities they seek to control. In this section, we start by identifying 
the broader trends of rule by armed factions, focusing on the emergence of direct vs indirect 
rule configurations of power, before looking in more detail at the case of the Nduma Defense 
of Congo in the territory of Walikale. We then analyse and illustrate the consequences of 
these configurations of power for the legitimacy of local authorities.  
 
4.3 Indirect rule on a regional scale: the RCD and Mai Mai rebellions 
Nelson Kasfir defines rebel organisations as ‘consciously coordinated groups whose 
members engage in protracted violence with the intention of gaining undisputed political 
control over all or a portion of a pre-existing state’s territory’ (Kasfir 2014: 24). While many of 
the armed factions that have roamed the eastern provinces of DRC do not neatly fit this 
category (many are rather small bandit groups, village auto defence groups, or state-
sponsored militia), a number of larger-scale groups have also emerged. Not all rebel 
factions, however, engage in governance. Kasfir defines the field in the following way: 
  
Rebel governance, at a minimum, means the organization of civilians within rebel 
held territory for a public purpose. These purposes include rebel encouragement 
of civilian participation, provision of civilian administration, or organization of 
civilians for significant material gain. The presence of any aspect of one of these 
three types of activities is sufficient to indicate governance. It also includes rebel 
acceptance of pre-existing local government.  
(Kasfir 2014: 24)  
 
As a result, we will restrict the analysis to those rebel factions that meet these conditions. 
 
The largest non-state rebel faction to have ruled over eastern DRC since the 1990s was the 
Rassemblement Congolais pour la Democratie (RCD), which split into two sub-factions, 
RCD Goma and RCD Kisangani, during the second Congo war. The RCD exceeded any 
other armed faction in the region by its geographical scope, its military means, and the 
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duration and complexity of the modes of governance it developed. A movement with 
significant international backing – in particular by Rwanda and Uganda – the RCD was also 
supported throughout its existence by a complex web of local, national and regional elites 
(analysis of which is beyond the scope of this brief overview; see Stearns 2012). The RCD’s 
control over the eastern provinces was, however, highly uneven, and mostly focused on the 
larger urban centres, the strategic roads and the most lucrative areas of economic activity 
(Turner 2005; Stearns 2011). Throughout the rural areas of eastern DRC, it faced a fierce 
armed insurgency, the Mai Mai movement, which garnered significant popular support and 
operated mostly through hit-and-run guerrilla tactics. In the regional capitals of North and 
South Kivu, the RCD ‘seized’ the state apparatus and, following a round of purges of political 
and intellectual opponents, used it as a handle to govern over the provincial capitals and 
their immediate vicinity without substantially changing existing modes of rule (Tull 2003, 
2005).  
 
However, as it faced challenges and resistance to its power, it sought to co-opt existing 
elites in order to assert its power over their ethno-territorial constituencies, usually by 
offering them power-sharing agreements. This was the case, for example, for the co-option 
of the Bashi customary authorities and elite networks in Bukavu and the territory of Walungu 
in South Kivu. Bolstered by a long tradition of resistance to Rwandan invasions, the Shi had 
organised an armed group – the Mudundu 40 – following a severe repression by the RCD 
after they seized Bukavu in 1998, which included a massacre and the killing of one of the Shi 
customary chiefs (Turner 2005). Co-opting such elite networks allowed them to immediately 
reduce the intensity of the insurgencies they faced, while taking control over resource 
mobilisation networks and developing short-term legitimacy, as these elites and their 
networks would seek to garner popular support through discursive efforts.  
 
Similarly, in an attempt to reduce the intensity of the Mai Mai insurgency they faced in the 
region of Bunyakiri, home of the Batembo ethno-territorial constituency and rural base of the 
largest Mai Mai group in eastern DRC (the Mai Mai Padiri, see below), they granted territorial 
autonomy to the Batembo leaders. Since the crafting of the colonial ethno-territorial order, 
the Batembo had been subjected to the rule of the Havu of the lakeshores of the territory of 
Kalehe, which had fed longstanding political and social grievances and motivated repeated 
attempts to obtain their own territory (Hoffmann 2014; Hoffmann et al. 2016). The granting of 
territorial autonomy allowed the RCD to enter the territory of Bunyakiri, establish military 
outposts and reduce the Mai Mai insurgency in the area.  
 
While allowing it to achieve short-term counterinsurgency objectives and obtain temporary 
access to resource mobilisation mechanisms, such indirect rule strategies often backfired, as 
those local authorities and elites co-opted by the RCD soon experienced a severe reduction 
of their legitimacy. For the non-Rwandophone populations of eastern DRC, the RCD was 
largely perceived as a foreign invasion by Rwanda, not considered legitimate to control 
territory or rule. In rural areas, chiefs who had collaborated with the RCD were often 
considered traitors. For example, in the Lakeshore and Midland areas of the territory of 
Kalehe, the participation of local chiefs in recruitment for the RCD-sponsored Local Defence 
Force often backfired against their perceived legitimacy. While the initiative at first received 
popular support, attracting large numbers of youth into the Local Defence Force, the coerced 
corralling of these forces into the RCD army caused large-scale defections among these 
youth, many of whom returned to their villages after defecting. Strategically or under threat 
from the RCD, many chiefs were required to monitor and seek to re-enrol these youth into 
the Local Defence Force, which sparked resistance from local youth and increased support 
for the Mai Mai insurgency (Marchais 2016; Hoffmann et al. 2016). Thus, the erosion of the 
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legitimacy of local chiefs incorporated into indirect rule arrangements was significantly 
enhanced by the social polarisation triggered by the war. 
 
Such an effect of de-legitimisation of local authorities was also visible in the Mai Mai 
movement, the second largest non-state armed force in the province of South Kivu. The 
Mayi-Mayi resistance movement that had emerged in July 1997 against the Alliance of 
Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo (AFDL), and intensified when the RCD seized 
the eastern provinces of DRC, was subjected to opposing processes of centralisation and 
fragmentation, with great variation according to the different geographical areas in which it 
operated. Under the command of general Padiri, the Mayi-Mayi adopted a structure mirroring 
that of the defunct Zairian army in the east (Hoffmann 2007: 58). The centralisation of 
military command was accompanied by an effort to centralise resource mobilisation; this 
echoed the long history of resource extraction in the region and required the establishment 
of an elaborate system of governance of civilian populations, which effectively became an 
effort to build a fully functioning state. At the centre of the structure was the etat major 
politico-militaire (politico-military headquarters). A rudimentary administration des Forets 
(forest administration) was set up at the military headquarters of the armed group in the 
village of Mangaa, with a civilian administrator at its head, although Padiri had a tendency to 
rule in an autocratic and personalised manner (Morvan 2005: 57). The governance of civilian 
populations combined direct modes of administration, and more decentralised forms of 
administration through local chiefs.  
 
Deploying soldiers in the various axes (roads) that it controlled, the group set up an 
elaborate system of taxation to finance its war effort, with some sectors of the economy 
coming under direct control by the movement, while others were left to more decentralised 
forms of taxation through intermediaries. For example, the regulation and taxation of the 
mining sector was highly centralised, with Padiri deploying soldiers to each mine under his 
control to collect taxes in kind or in cash, which were directly channelled back to his 
headquarters.7 On the other hand, the collection of compulsory household taxes – known as 
effort de guerre or ration (war effort) – was usually delegated to local chiefs, under the threat 
of violence. The imposition of such taxes and administrations, however, did not happen 
seamlessly, as we will seek to illustrate with the example of the Nduma Defense of Congo.  
 
4.4 Governance in the Nduma Defense of Congo (NDC) 
A recent case of a non-state armed group of medium scale controlling territory and 
administering populations is that of the Nduma Defense of Congo (NDC), commanded by 
the self-proclaimed General Sheka. The former Director General of Bisie, one of the largest 
cassiterite mines in the remote territory of Walikale in North Kivu, Ntabo Taberi Sheka 
(Sheka) decided in 2008 to ‘take things into his own hands’ and form his own armed faction, 
allegedly to rid the country of the ‘Rwandan infiltration’, to restore security in the territory of 
Walikale, and to ensure that the mineral wealth of his native territory was redistributed to its 
own people.8  
 
After an initial phase of close collaboration with the Rwandan rebel faction Front de 
Liberation du Rwanda (FDLR), which had its base and significant military power in the 
territory of Walikale, Sheka and the NDC turned against the FDLR in 2011, assassinating 
Lieutenant Colonel Evariste Kanzeguhera (alias Sadiki), one of the FDLR’s prominent 
                                               
7  For a detailed analysis of the modes of taxation of the mining sector see (Sanchez de la Sierra, forthcoming).  
8  NDC official manifesto: ‘Cahier des charges du Mouvement Nduma Defense of Congo « NDC » de NTABO NTABERI 
SHEKA. 
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military commanders, thereby initiating a brutal cycle of violence between the NDC and the 
FDLR, which repeatedly targeted civilians.9 Following intense fighting, the group pushed the 
FDLR out of several of its strongholds, and established military control over its ‘own’ villages 
for the first time along the road from Lubungi-Kembe to Kalonge. The group then continued 
its expansion, attacking and chasing the FDLR out of the Misao and Limingi ‘axe’, and then 
pushing to Pinga where, following heavy combat against government forces, they took 
control of the town and made it their military and administrative headquarters.  
 
Thus, within just a few months, the NDC took partial control of a territory of several hundred 
square kilometres, and dozens of villages within that territory. As the NDC immediately 
proceeded to establish rule over these villages and govern civilian populations, deciding on 
the allocation of military resources and the institutional arrangements to govern local 
populations, this period provides an illuminating example of the challenges that armed 
factions face in setting up institutions of rule. In the following section, we use this example to 
show how different sets of constraints and factors explain the types of administration set up 
by the NDC, and in particular the establishment of more ‘direct’ or indirect forms of rule.  
 
4.5 Direct vs indirect rule: strategic and economic factors 
The region that came under control of the NDC, like many rural parts of eastern DRC, is 
marked by extremely difficult terrain – a combination of high mountains and volcanoes and 
dense, impenetrable tropical forests. Establishing and maintaining military control over such 
areas is a difficult if not impossible task, one which neither the colonial nor post-colonial 
state were able to achieve (Herbst 2000). Thus, with limited financial, logistical and military 
resources, the geographical allocation of military resources is a crucial strategic and financial 
imperative, and one which can determine the fate of a non-state rebel group. In turn, the 
distribution of these resources can affect the armed faction’s administrative capacity, and, 
when armed group rule extends over a long period, can have far-reaching consequences in 
terms of political, economic and social trajectories of entities subjected to their rule.  
 
Among the numerous reasons invoked by commanders and members of armed groups to 
explain the distribution of military means, two feature most prominently: military strategy and 
the need to mobilise resources (taxes and labour). This is not particularly surprising given 
the limitations armed groups face in terms of finances and military capacity, but also the 
context of extreme poverty; generating revenue is vital both for the survival of the armed 
group as an enterprise, but also for its members and their dependants. In the region that fell 
under its control, the NDC deployed military resources – soldiers and weapons – in strategic 
locations, in order to be able to counter attacks by enemy factions, in particular the FDLR, 
the Alliance des Patriotes pour un Congo Libre et Souverain (APCLS), and the Congolese 
army. But a significant part of the resources were devoted to controlling the most lucrative 
centres in the area, particularly the mines and larger trading centres.  
 
According to the former T5 (director of communications) of the NDC, it initially sent 
delegations to all the villages that fell under its control, with the intention of leaving one or 
two soldiers in each village. Following the territorial expansion of the group, troops were 
soon concentrated in the larger urban centres and around the mining areas, resulting in 
strong geographical imbalances in the distribution of military and administrative resources: 
‘We weren’t very interested in villages with no mining activity and with a small population; 
                                               
9  The breakdown of the NDC–FDLR alliance was allegedly due to direct orders from president Kabila to Sheka to 
dismantle the FDLR, after the repeated failure of government military operations and growing frustration by Rwanda 
with the situation, and pressure from Rwanda on Kabila to find a solution to get rid of the FDLR.  
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where there were mines, or in the larger centres with a strong population, that is where you 
could find most of our soldiers’.10 Such uneven distribution of resources echoes the highly 
unequal geographic distribution of military and administrative resources by both the colonial 
and post-colonial states, which faced similar logistical constraints (Boone 2003; Herbst 
2000). 
 
The NDC’s modes of administration of economic, social and political activity closely reflected 
the double imperative of maintaining strategic military control and mobilising resources for 
the group, but also, as we will see, the necessity of establishing a form of legitimacy for the 
group’s rule over civilian populations. Like many of the rebel groups that have controlled 
territory in eastern DRC, the NDC set up an elaborate apparatus of taxation and resource 
extraction (Sanchez de la Sierra forthcoming; Hoffmann and Vlassenroot 2014; Stearns 
2011). Efforts to levy taxes, and the military and administrative means deployed to collect 
and enforce taxation, were similarly concentrated on the most lucrative sectors of economic 
activity, with a particular focus on mining sites. The right to access mining sites of creuseurs 
(diggers) was fined, as well as their daily production (by searching and weighting each 
creuseur’s production at the exit of the mining site) – a mode of taxation which armed groups 
have applied extensively throughout the region (Sanchez de la Sierra forthcoming).  
 
Another mechanism to obtain revenue from the mines was the imposition of a day of 
‘salongo’ (forced labour) each week to all creuseurs in each mine,11 during which all the 
diggers were required to dig for minerals and hand over the day’s production to the group. 
Such taxation practices required a significant presence of soldiers in and around the mining 
sites, enhancing the concentration of resources in such areas, and favouring much more 
intrusive and ‘direct’ modes of administration and organisation of mining activity. While each 
mine still had a president directeur general (PDG), in charge of production and the 
organisation of miners, the PDG was closely monitored by the NDC’s emissaries, to which 
he owed full accountability. PDGs who did not fully comply with the group’s orders were 
threatened with death or replaced, either by more complacent intermediaries or directly by 
members of the NDC. Thus, the high revenue streams generated by mining activity 
prompted much more direct forms of military and administrative control over that sector of 
the economy.  
 
An extensive range of taxes were also applied on other sectors of the economy, although not 
with the type of attention and investment the mining sector received. The group taxed trade 
by setting up roadblocks and fining access to local markets, as well as agricultural and 
hunting activity by imposing taxes on agricultural production, windmill taxes, taxes on the 
production of local alcoholic beverages (kasiksi) and hunting taxes. The collection of these 
taxes was devolved to intermediaries, usually representatives of these sectors, but revenue 
streams were then highly centralised into the central administration of the group (the bureau 
1), which was in charge of counting and verifying all taxation revenues.  
 
The most extensive tax imposed by the group, however, was a head tax on all adults in the 
areas controlled by the group, called the ‘effort de guerre’ (war effort), which relied on a devolved 
mode of administration and collection through local chiefs, echoing the historical role of local 
chiefs in the mobilisation of resources covered in the first part of this paper. Throughout the 
NDC’s territory, all adults were compulsorily required to pay 1,000 Congolese francs per month 
                                               
10  Interview with former NDC T5 (director of communications) and soldier, February 2017. 
11  The salongo is a system of compulsory free labour that was first imposed on Congolese populations during the colonial 
era, and maintained throughout the post-colonial era.  
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– a decision taken by the group’s leadership, without consultation of local populations or 
local authorities.12 Taxes were collected at the village level, with local chiefs tasked with 
reporting the number of residents to the group, and then collecting the taxes on a monthly 
basis. The group would often send a ‘technical team’ to carry out a verification of the number 
of residents. Once the taxes were collected, the group’s envoys would distribute ‘jetons’ 
(chips) to the chief, which the chief would then distribute to the residents who had paid the 
tax and could then be used to prove they had indeed paid it. Delegation of supervision and 
collection of taxation to local chiefs was enforced through ruthless violence. Small groups of 
soldiers were tasked with carrying out checks in the villages, and any person who was not 
able to present a jeton received 50 to 100 lashes, and was ordered to pay a fine of 50,000–
100,000 Congolese francs (US$50–100) – a prohibitive sum for extremely poor rural 
households.13  
 
4.6 The advantages and limitations of indirect rule 
As a result of strategic and economic imperatives, coupled with the scarcity of military, 
administrative and logistical resources, but also the requirement of not upsetting too 
profoundly the social and political order of areas under its control, the group – like many 
others in the region – relied heavily on intermediaries to collect resources and govern the 
daily life of civilians, setting up rudimentary forms of ‘indirect rule’ types of governance 
configurations. As just mentioned, these intermediaries were key in the collection of taxes for 
the group, in particular local chiefs who were tasked with the collection of the head tax on 
their populations. The group thus ‘appropriated’ existing institutions of local authority and 
resource mobilisation, seeking to gear them towards their own ends.  
 
This was also the case with civilian authorities, including the representatives of the state. 
Indeed, the group established what it called ‘cadres civils’ or ‘cadres politiques’ (civilian or 
political leaders), enrolling the territorial administrator of Walikale, Akilimani Busanga 
Prosper, and appointing a political director, Ohumu Kataka Beton, to supervise political and 
civilian administration. These cadres were tasked, among other things, with verifying that the 
information provided to the NDC by chiefs on the population size of their villages was 
correct. Similarly, the group set up its own police force, headed by Luc Tandu Bindu. Rather 
than developing an entirely new police force, the group enrolled all existing police officers in 
the areas they controlled, and required them to continue doing their work, albeit as NDC 
police and not national police. Along with the village chiefs, civilian administrators and police 
officers were also tasked with reporting the presence of Rwandophone residents in the area. 
The NDC considered all Rwandophone civilians to be supporters of Rwandan armed groups, 
which they were trying to defeat and chase out of the territory. When discovered either 
directly by the NDC or reported to it by its intermediaries, Rwandophone civilian leaders and 
civilian populations (including women and children) were brutally assassinated. 
 
Thus, rather than developing their own administration from scratch, the group often relied on 
pre-existing local authorities, cadres, and chiefs, to impose its rule. This, however, did not 
happen without problems. The heavy burden of taxation imposed by the group, and the 
range of tracasseries (day-to-day harassment) its soldiers engaged in meant that civilians 
and authorities were often reluctant to fully collaborate.14 When discovered by the group, 
reluctance or resistance (passive or active) entailed immediate sanctions that ranged from 
public beatings or lashings to summary executions. According to the former T5 of the NDC, 
                                               
12  Interview with ex-T5 (director of communications) of the NDC, February 2017.  
13  ibid. 
14  Interviews with civilian leaders and customary authorities, Walikale, 2015–17. 
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the existing authorities of a given area were only kept if they were ‘trustworthy, and followed 
closely the orders of the movement’. However, while replacing former state and police 
authorities or other local leaders was relatively straightforward, replacing local chiefs who 
showed reluctance to comply with the group’s rule was a more sensitive issue, particularly 
when these chiefs had customary authority.15 According to the T5, replacing a customary 
chief would immediately entail a loss in the group’s military strength and legitimacy:  
 
We could not replace a customary chief, because that would be going against 
our ancestors… The strength with which we fought came directly from our 
ancestors… The customary chiefs are the representatives of our ancestors, so 
going against them is automatically going against the movement. 
(Interview with ex-T5 (director of communications) of the NDC, February 2017)  
 
In the groupement of Ihana (the administrative subdivision below the territory) over which the 
NDC took partial control, the chef de groupement (customary chief), Mwami Kitwana Ngulu 
Seraphin, fled to Goma, the capital of North Kivu, to escape the incessant combats and 
insecurity, leaving the offices of the chiefdom empty. However, he had appointed an interim, 
Mwami Blaise Tumbiwa, who, despite not being the recognised ruler, nevertheless had 
some degree of legitimacy. Conscious of the importance of being associated with the 
customary authorities, the NDC made substantial efforts to be close to Blaise Tumbiwa: ‘We 
needed to be very close to Mwami Blaise, so we were in constant contact. We would visit 
him in his house and he would visit us, and he would help us with the cause.’  
 
While the NDC seems to have displayed respect and deference with regards to the more 
important chiefs, the group could display extreme coercion towards less important chiefs – 
chefs de localite and chefs de village – and particularly chiefs whose authority did not stem 
from custom. In the village of Kashumba, a detachment of the NDC led by the T5 was sent 
out in early 2012 with the task of recruiting soldiers for the group and ‘encouraging’ 
populations to comply with the head tax. At their arrival in Kashumba, the T5 noted that the 
village had organised a local chapter of the Raia Mutomboki, an ad hoc grass-roots armed 
movement that had started in 2011 in the territory of Shabunda, South Kivu, and spread 
throughout South and North Kivu (Stearns et al. 2013; Vogel 2014). Upon arrival of the NDC 
detachment, the Raia Mutomboki pleaded allegiance to the NDC, most likely because of its 
superior military capacity. Through discussions with the elders held in the village barza,16 
however, the NDC commander was informed that the village chief had told his population 
that his role was not to be a host for any visitors (the NDC) and collect taxes on behalf of 
them, but rather to receive taxes himself as a result of his traditional authority and ownership 
over land. Irritated by what he heard, the T5 ordered his troops to heavily lash the chief, and 
beat him to a point of near-death. The next morning, the T5 convened a reunion with the 
entire village, and further lashed and beat up the chief in front of his population, stating that 
the chief had brought this upon himself by refusing to follow the group’s ‘ideology’. Such 
disciplinary beatings of reluctant chiefs were commonplace and, on rare occasions, chiefs 
would be assassinated. This would happen when chiefs were suspected of collaborating with 
enemy armed factions, and particularly with the FDLR. Assassinating chiefs, however, posed 
the complex question of succession. For chiefs tied to the custom, the group had to follow 
the customary procedure of appointing the chief’s successor among his lineage. This could 
                                               
15  In DRC, not all chiefs owe their authority to custom. The imposition of indirect rule during the colonial era included the 
appointment of chiefs in acephalous or highly decentralised societies, such as the Rega of South Kivu (Biebuyck 1973). 
As a result, such chiefs do not enjoy the type of recognition of their authority that chiefs associated to local customary 
systems do, and the population constantly makes the distinction between chiefs ‘from the custom’ and these appointed 
chiefs. 
16  A barza is a village assembly of village elders and leaders, where issues concerning village affairs are discussed.  
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generate conflicts of succession, in which the group would support – and often impose – a 
successor who seemed compliant to their cause.17  
 
Such coercive actions towards local chiefs and interferences with customary politics and 
successions could, however, weaken the group’s legitimacy. Although the group’s leaders 
and a majority of its membership were natives of Walikale, which – in the context of the 
ethno-territorial conceptions of authority that are prevalent in eastern DRC – conferred on 
them a substantial advantage over groups perceived as foreigners (in particular the FDLR), 
their legitimacy was nonetheless tributary of their actions. In order to assert the legitimacy of 
their claims to rule and to mobilise resources, the group deployed a range of discursive and 
ritual practices, building on the variegated repertoire of claims to political legitimacy in 
eastern DRC (Hoffmann 2016; Hoffmann and Vlassenroot 2014). Public meetings were 
organised after the conquest of a village, and then regularly throughout the group’s presence 
in an area. The purpose of such meetings was to assert the group’s coercive power by 
putting troop numbers and weapons on display, but also to expose the group’s ‘ideology’ – 
its motives for fighting and taking control over a particular village. These were couched in 
references to local idioms of authority and traditional sources of power, but also in claims to 
bring security and development to the village – a modernist discursive repertoire long used 
by armed groups in the region (Hoffmann 2014). A video obtained by the authors, of one of 
the group’s public meetings in the town of Pinga, shows that the group’s leaders – in this 
case Sheka himself – would deploy extensive efforts to convince the population of the 
righteousness and legitimacy of the movement’s objectives and rule over the village, 
resorting to chants, inviting local customary authorities to publicly give their backing, and 
arguing that the group’s presence would enhance cooperation and development within the 
village.  
 
4.7 The impact of indirect rule on local authority 
The co-option of local authorities by armed groups is not without consequences for the way 
they are perceived by their populations, their level of legitimacy and their capacity to 
organise local collective action. However, the mechanisms tying the emergence or 
imposition of ‘indirect rule’ types of governance arrangements and the legitimacy of local 
authorities and institutions are neither linear nor uniform. The relationship between armed 
groups and local authorities is the result of elaborate negotiations that play out not only at 
the onset of a group’s control over a certain entity, but throughout their period of control and 
beyond, and can change significantly in time. While armed groups often make use of their 
coercive advantage – as we have seen with the example of the NDC – they remain reliant on 
local authorities for the collection of resources and to gain legitimacy, which can confer 
significant bargaining power to local authorities. This negotiated relationship is influenced by 
a range of factors, most notably the social basis of the armed groups, the relationship 
between the armed group and the chiefs, and by the armed groups’ and local authorities’ 
actions. Here, we identify some of the core mechanisms through which the legitimacy of 
local authorities is either eroded or reinforced. We focus on three mechanisms through 
which the legitimacy of local authorities can be eroded: (a) the thwarting of the chief’s 
accountability from the population towards the group; (b) the militarisation of succession 
conflicts; and (c) social polarisation. We use the example of the NDC and other groups in the 
region to illustrate some of the ways in which these mechanisms operate.  
 
                                               
17  Interviews with civilian leaders and customary authorities, Walikale, 2015–17. 
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4.7.1 Mechanisms of erosion of legitimacy  
Local authorities’ legitimacy can be significantly dented by their association or perceived 
collaboration with groups considered to be illegitimate. The mechanisms through which this 
can occur are similar to those identified in the literature analysing the effects of colonial rule 
on the legitimacy of customary chiefs. Association with groups perceived as inherently 
illegitimate, as a result of their origins, can be particularly damaging for the reputation of 
local authorities. In eastern DRC, where ethno-territorial origins are a key pillar of legitimate 
authority, Rwandophone groups have historically been considered as foreign and illegitimate 
rulers (as seen with the example of the RCD). In interviews carried out with local chiefs in 
Walikale and several territories of South Kivu, those who had been subjected to such rulers 
usually argued that they had no choice but to collaborate with these groups as resistance 
would immediately entail death, and that their populations were conscious of this fact and 
took it into account in the way they perceived their chiefs’ actions. Interviews with residents, 
however, painted a much more nuanced and variegated picture, and revealed that chiefs 
were closely judged on their reactions to the imposition of armed group rule. For example, 
chiefs that fled upon the arrival of armed groups were judged very harshly, considered as 
‘scared; these are not real chiefs for our village, imagine a chief who knows that his 
population will suffer and who runs away?’18 Such a reaction could be reinforced if the chiefs 
subsequently stayed in exile, with the notable exception of chiefs who were known to be 
organising various forms of resistance.  
 
Chiefs who did stay were scrutinised on their behaviour. In interviews, respondents were 
closely aware of the fact that the presence and demands of the group on the chief in terms 
of tax and labour mobilisation thwarted the direction of the chief’s accountability towards the 
group and away from the population, a process which Mamdani (1996) has shown to be at 
the heart of the de-legitimising effects of colonial indirect rule. While most interviewees 
stressed that the chief had little choice but to comply with the group, a fair number of them 
considered that the chief’s position, despite being more exposed to direct violence by the 
group, was in fact a relatively advantageous one:  
 
If the chiefs collect what the group has asked him to, he will not be bothered; he 
is not going to suffer like the population suffers; we also know that the chief gets 
something in what is collected by the group, although he doesn’t tell us; it is 
always the population that will suffer in these situations and we cannot do 
anything because our chief can’t even help us. 
(Interview with resident of Walikale centre, November 2015)  
 
Such accusations of the chief getting a cut out of the taxes collected by the groups were not 
uncommon, and constituted one of the major grievances populations had with regards to 
their authorities in contexts of armed group rule.  
 
Moreover, chiefs subjected to ‘indirect rule’ configurations were often accused of failing to 
protect their populations and their livelihoods. This was reported in the village of Abatokolo in 
Walikale, a village repeatedly occupied by armed groups as a result of its remoteness, 
where interviews revealed that the population no longer felt that the chief protected them 
from abusive behaviour or taxation by armed groups. Following the assassination of a 
nyumbakumi (sub-village chief) by the RCD in 2003, the village chief and sub-chiefs would 
be reluctant to report violent or inappropriate behaviour by soldiers to those further up the 
armed group’s hierarchy for fear of being beaten or killed. While residents usually 
                                               
18  Interview with resident of Mubugu grouping, Numbi, September 2012.  
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understood that the chief had little margin of manoeuvre with regards to these types of 
abusive or exploitative behaviours, the chief’s role as a spiritual and practical protector of his 
population decreased, eroding one of the central tenets of chief authority and legitimacy. A 
local resident recalled: ‘After a while, we do not ask him to do that anymore, because we 
know that he is afraid of being killed by the group; what could he do’?19  
 
The same was true for the seizing of goods and assets, such as houses, land or material 
goods confiscated from village residents. While local chiefs would often plead for the return 
of such goods, or try to mediate between the groups and the population, their demands 
would rarely be met. In certain areas, such as the midlands and the highlands of Kalehe in 
the territory of South Kivu, local chiefs could be complicit in the land-grabbing 
commandeered by regional elite networks and carried out by armed factions, which often 
entailed the violent eviction of entire families from the land (Van Acker 2005; Ansoms, 
Claessens and Mudinga 2014). Interviews carried out in that region in 2012 and 2013 
pointed to the fact that chiefs often denied having a part in these land-grabbings, attributing 
the blame to the armed groups and their own helplessness in the fact of military force; the 
interviews also revealed that many among the local population considered the chiefs to be 
complicit.  
 
The most contentious issue, however, was the forced enrolment of villagers for sexual 
services, labour or combat. A widespread practice of armed groups was to forcefully ‘marry’ 
village women, which often amounted to sexual harassment and rape. Chiefs were usually 
asked to give their consent to such marriages, and were mostly incapable of refusing, given 
the implicit or explicit threat of violence. Such bogus weddings would erode the symbolic 
authority of chiefs over one of the core institutions of rural Kivutian society. Equally 
contentious was the forced enrolment of villagers by the group to serve as porters or 
soldiers. Groups such as the Mai Mai Padiri in the territories of Kalehe and Shabunda, in 
South Kivu, would ask all villages they controlled to provide a certain number of men, and 
would delegate the task of enrolling these men to the local chiefs, who were tasked with 
establishing lists of potential candidates and sensibilisation (convincing them to be enlisted 
as soldiers).20 Those targeted for recruitment would often flee, and the chief would be 
reprimanded by their families for facilitating the recruitment of their child. In addition to such 
volunteering of villagers without their consent, the denunciation of villagers to the armed 
group could significantly enhance distrust and grievances against the chief. This was 
particularly the case in contexts of counter-insurgency, where armed factions relied on local 
chiefs to denounce members or supporters of opposing armed factions. In certain cases, as 
during the Raia Mutomboki insurgency in South Kivu, or in the territories held by the NDC, 
chiefs and local authorities were required to denounce all Rwandophone populations in their 
area, who would be killed.  
 
The mechanisms through which local chiefs’ accountability towards their populations were 
thwarted were accentuated by the process of social polarisation, one of the central ‘social 
processes of civil war’ (Wood 2008), which further eroded the authority and legitimacy of 
local chiefs. The mechanisms underpinning social polarisation in civil war are complex, but 
are generally tied to the alignment of certain segments of local societies with opposing 
armed factions, which results in multiple forms of social conflict. As previously mentioned, 
armed groups in South Kivu often have complex and deep ramifications in local societies 
from which they emerge, and can ‘appropriate’ pre-existing social networks or craft new 
                                               
19  Interview with Abakatalo resident, July 2016.  
20  Interview with former bodyguard of general Padiri, Bukavu, 13 August 2012.  
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ones, strengthening their ‘social-institutional’ basis and enabling control over local societies 
(Staniland 2015). In areas falling under their partial or total control, relatives of armed group 
members – often the younger brothers – would serve as spies for the group, and report 
suspicious activity within the village, and closely scrutinise the behaviour of the chief with 
regards to his tax collection and labour mobilisation duties. This could considerably reduce 
the chiefs’ scope of action and autonomy in the management of village affairs, as – although 
nominally remaining the main authority in the village – his actions and decisions could be 
countered by the group. In the village of Lemera, in the territory of Kalehe, where the Mai 
Mai Kalehe headed by Muhindo Changoco and Cisayura Bienvenue set up their base during 
the second Congo war, the chief, who had been enlisted by the group to collect taxes and 
was closely monitored by the group’s networks of relatives, considered that:  
 
I had lost my authority over the population of my village... especially the families 
of the Mai Mai, to whom I couldn’t say anything. If I say something, they will 
denounce me to the group and they come and imprison me, lash me, or beat up 
my family. 
(Interview with chief of Kasheke, November 2012) 
 
Such loss of authority over certain segments of his population was often accompanied by the 
perception by others that the presence of the group gave the group’s relatives or supporters 
various forms of advantages. Relatives of armed faction members could be spared from the 
extortive and exploitative practices we have reviewed, benefit from the ‘protection’ of the 
group, and have privileged access to goods or to economic opportunities, generating 
resentment from the rest of the population. Over time, the entrenchment of such processes 
could either reinforce existing social classes – when groups were associated to pre-existing 
elites – or give rise to novel social classes, consolidating as a result of the presence of the 
group.  
 
The position of local authorities with regards to such dynamics is central to understanding 
the erosion or reinforcement of chiefs’ legitimacy. As previously mentioned, chiefs who were 
perceived to be benefiting from the presence of the armed group, or distributing benefits to 
certain segments of the population, could face substantial resentment from the general 
population, eroding and reducing their legitimacy. Conversely, when local authorities are not 
closely associated with the classes benefiting from the presence of the armed group, this 
can lead to a bypassing of the chiefs’ authority and prerogatives. This is particularly the 
case, for example, when those associated with the group modify property rights, such as 
when land is forcefully seized and appropriated by certain actors, with the backing of the 
armed factions. As this new distribution of property rights can challenge the ‘traditional’ order 
in which local chiefs are custodians of the land, conflicts over land ownership can quickly 
emerge, pitting the chiefs against the new classes of owners. In such cases, the group can 
decide to directly administer such land and remove it from the remit of local chiefs, 
establishing more direct forms of rule, which further erode local chiefs’ power. The erosive 
effects of indirect rule by armed factions are therefore highly differentiated.  
 
5  Conclusion 
In this article, we have explored some of the conditions of emergence of ‘indirect rule’ types 
of governance arrangements in contexts of armed conflict, as well as the consequences 
these have on local authorities. We started by ascertaining the theoretical relevance of the 
concept of indirect rule, and its applicability to contexts of armed conflict and rule by non-state 
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armed factions, setting important caveats to the risk of ‘conceptual stretching’, in particular 
with regards to exogeneity. Then, we gave an overview of the use of indirect rule types of 
governance arrangements in eastern DRC, showing as several authors have recently 
argued that it was a longstanding template of rule in the region. We then focused on the 
conditions of emergence of indirect rule arrangements during the Congolese wars, taking a 
broad overview and then zooming in to the case of the NDC.  
 
We have seen that the establishment of more intrusive and direct forms of rule on one side, 
and the enrolment of intermediaries and more indirect forms of rule on the other, was 
strongly guided by strategic and economic imperatives, but also the necessity for the group 
to establish a form of legitimacy for its rule over civilian populations. This generated 
particularly contentious issues around customary authorities, whose (often coerced) 
enrolment was necessary for the mobilisation of resources, but on whom groups often 
depended in order to establish a modicum of legitimacy around their rule. Furthermore, we 
have identified some of the core mechanisms through which the legitimacy of chiefs is 
affected by the establishment of indirect rule, in particular the thwarting of accountability of 
chiefs towards their population, the limiting of a chief’s capacity to protect his population and 
their livelihoods, and the divisive effects of social polarisation. Such mechanisms and 
processes, however, are highly contingent on local social and historical configurations, and 
can play out in multiple ways, which calls for further in-depth case studies.  
 
Furthermore, the magnitude of these mechanisms and effects remains poorly quantified. As 
the purpose of this qualitative research paper was to situate this particular mode of rule in 
the region’s history of political organisation, and the mechanisms that lead to the imposition 
of indirect types of configurations of rule and their effects, the companion paper takes a 
quantitative perspective to analyse the causes of emergence and the effects of indirect rule 
on the authority and legitimacy of local chiefs. Based on retrospective panel data collected 
through a large survey in the province of North Kivu, which made it possible to reconstitute 
the political and security history of 200 villages along key variables, but also the history of 
the chiefdoms and successions, the paper brings empirical support to the mechanisms 
identified in this paper.  
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